A Law Built for Huawei, Turned on a San Francisco Startup
The legal instruments the Pentagon used against Anthropic -- 10 U.S.C. Section 3252 and the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act (FASCSA) -- were designed with a specific threat in mind: foreign adversaries embedding backdoors in technology sold to the U.S. government. The canonical targets are Huawei and Kaspersky, companies with documented ties to the Chinese and Russian governments respectively. The statutes grant the executive branch power to remove foreign-controlled technology from sensitive supply chains without the slow machinery of congressional action. Applying this framework to Anthropic, a company headquartered in San Francisco with no foreign government ties, represents an unprecedented expansion of executive power.
Multiple legal scholars have flagged this as a fundamental misuse of the statute. Professor Alan Rozenshtein of the University of Minnesota questioned whether the law 'can even apply to an American company where there's no foreign entanglement.' Tess Bridgeman of Just Security argued the designation exceeds its statutory authority entirely, noting that the law does not grant power to prohibit all commercial activity with a designated company. Amos Toh of the Brennan Center made perhaps the sharpest point: Anthropic's safety restrictions -- prohibiting mass surveillance and fully autonomous weapons -- are 'basically safety protocols' that 'run directly counter to the risk that the law is designed to regulate.' In other words, the statute was built to address companies that pose security risks through what they hide; Anthropic was designated for what it openly refused to do. This distinction matters because it transforms a narrow national security tool into a broad instrument of commercial coercion -- one that could theoretically be applied to any domestic company that declines a government demand.



